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IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?
USING FAILURE-TO-WARN LIABILITY TO
ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF
ONLINE PRESCRmING
CHESTER CIiuANO*

The ability to obtain prescription medications over the Internet witholll a proper
prescription has inflamed regulators nationwide. Federal and state officials alike
have proposed a host of new laws and regulations that attempt to limit this burgeoning phenomenon. Yet premature regulation of Internet prescribing cOllld prevent consumers from realizing the tremendous benefits the Internet might one day
provide to the American health care delivery system. In this Note, Chester Chuang
argues that subjecting Internet prescribing to a traditional failure-to-warn liability
framework, rather than to additional regulations, adequately will ensure patient
safety while allowing for the necessary innovations that will legitimize the distribution of prescription medications over the Internet. He suggests that pharmacetllical
manufacturers can satisfy their duty to warn by contractually obligating websites
that dispense prescription medications to implement comprehensive patient information systems. Chuang concludes that the proper application of this framework
to these patient information systems will make certain that pharmacelllical mantlfacturen strike the proper balance between patients' health and safety concerns and
the possibilities of Internet prescribing.

IN1'RODUCI10N

The learned intermediary doctrine exempts pharmaceutical companies from the general rule requiring manufacturers to warn consumers of dangers inherent in their products.1 Under this doctrine, to
fulfill its legal duty to warn, a prescription drug manufacturer need
only provide adequate warnings about its medications to the prescribing physician, and not to the ultimate user.2 At its core, the doctrine is

* Special thanks to Robert L. Rabin for his help in shaping this piece. This Note could
not have been published without the extraordinary talents of Raclha A. Pathak, Dahlin S.
Fetouh, Micbael J. Kasdan, Janet R. Carter, Rafael I. Pardo, and the staff of the New York
University Law Review. Thanks also to Kenneth Hale and Lydia L. Chuang for their research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that
makers of unavoidably unsafe products have duty to provide proper warnings); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) (1997) (same). The learned intermediary
doctrine will be discussed further, see infra Part II.A.
2 See, e.g., Burton v. American Home Prods. Corp. (In re Norplaot Contraceptive
Prods. Uab. Litig.), 955 F. Supp. 700, 703 (B.D. Tex. 1997) ("Under the learned intermediary doctrine, 'when a drug manufacturer properly warns a prescribing physician of the
dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between the
1452
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based on traditional notions of the ideal physician-patient relationship-the physician as a trusted father figure, and the deferential patient, confident in his care. The explosion of Internet prescribing,
however, has forced a reevaluation of whether this traditional relationsbip is the only viable way to prescribe and dispense prescription
medications. Prescription drugs are freely available on the World
Wide Web, with or without a prescription, from sites with varying degrees of restrictions and reputability.3 In an online world where the
physician is conspicuously absent, or at best virtual, the learned intermediary doctrine breaks down, leaving pharmaceutical manufacturers
with the duty to warn the ultimate purchasers of the risks their medications carry.4 Because of the very nature of prescription drugs and
the way they are distributed, however, most drug manufacturers are
currently unable to provide adequate risk information directly to each
patient.s Therefore, this duty effectively could preclude manufacturers from seIling their products online.6
This Note argues that manufacturers can satisfy the duty to warn
that is owed to consumers who purchase prescription medications
from Internet prescribing sites by contractually obligating the websites
to implement comprehensive patient information systems. Analyzing
these systems under a traditional failure-to-warn liability framework
will allow reputable sites to mature into reliable sources of prescription medications for consumers, while cutting off the supply of drugs
to fraudulent sites without resorting to increased government regulation. Ideally, this framework \ViIl force manufacturers to weigh patients' health and safety with the commercial and practical advantages
of Internet prescribing.
Part I of this Note chronicles the rise of Internet prescribing and
the increased access to prescription medications it offers the everyday
consumer. Part II outlines the learned intermediary doctrine and discusses why it is inapplicable to current online prescribing practices.
This Part also describes the unique difficulties pharmaceutical manufacturers face when trying to implement a direct warning system, but
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer"" (quoting AIm v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 717
S.W.2d 588, 591-92 ('fex. 1986)), aff'd, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cr. 1999); Krasnopolsky v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp.1342, 1346 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (noting that mllDUCacturer"s
duty is to warn doctor. Dot patient); Wmdham v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 607. 611
(S.D. Miss. 1992) (same).
3 See infra Dates 11-20 and accompanying text for a description o[ these websilCSo
<4 The learned intermediary rule does Dot apply when a prescribing ph)'Sician is absent,
leaving manufacturers with the legal duty to warn patients direcUy about their medications.
See infra Part n.c.
5 For further discussion, see infra Parts lLA, n.c.
6 See infra Dote 94 and accompanying text.
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concludes by arguing that these difficulties should not dissuade manufacturers from exploring online prescribing. Part m presents a solution for conveying adequate patient warnings directly to the patient,
taking into account the unique challenges that Internet prescribing
presents. This Part proposes that the application of a traditional failure-to-warn analysis will enable manufacturers to use the Internet to
create comprehensive patient information systems that satisfy manufacturers' duty to warn in an online prescribing situation. There are
two ways this might be accomplished: first, by enhancing the online
physician-patient relationship so that it falls within the confines of the
learned intermediary doctrine, or second, by implementing Individualized Patient Reports (IPRs) without increasing the physician's role in
the transaction, thus spurning the protection of the learned intermediary doctrine completely. Fmally, this Part proposes that manufacturers, and not the government, must require web sites to implement
either of these systems in order to ensure the success of these patient
safety measures.
I
THE RISE OF INTERNET PRESCRIBING

Within the last few years, a multitude of pharmaceutical sites
have emerged on the Internet, selling everything from prescription
and over-the-counter medications to health and beauty aids.' The exploding popularity of these sites is closely linked to the development
of three new, increasingly popular, "lifestyle" medications designed to
enhance quality of life rather than to cure disease: Viagra, for impotence; Propecia, for hair loss; and Xenical, for weight loss.8 Often,
patients who wish to take these medications are embarrassed to ask
their doctors for a prescription and find comfort in the privacy and the
anonymity afforded them by ordering online. 9 The allure of these
sites is so strong that some experts predict that in the next five years
7 See Robin Herman, Drugstore on the Net (It's Quick, It's Convenient and It's Unregulated. Consumers Run the Risk of Harm With Do-It-Yourself Prescriptions), Wash.
Post, May 4, 1999, at Z14 ("In the past year, hundreds of pharmaceutical sites have popped
up on the Internet •..•").
8 See Naftali Bendavid, Prescriptions via Internet Pose Dangers: Doctors Fear Patients Will Skip Supervision, Checkups, Chi. 1li.b., June 16, 1999, § 1, at 1; Sberyl Gay
Stolberg, On-Line Prescription Practices Create Headache for Regulators, Chi. nib., June
27, 1999, § 1. at 8 (noting that online prescdbing is tied to emergence of Viagra, Propecia,
and Xenical).
9 See, e.g., Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that Internet is attractive to "those
who may be embarrassed to admit, even to their doctor, that they are impotent or concerned about their baldness or weight").
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online sales for prescription drugs and health and beauty products
may exceed $6 billion.tO
These websites fall roughly into two categories: "pharmacybased" and "prescribing-based."l1 "Pharmacy-based" sites operate
much like traditional comer drugstores. They are state-licensed and
require an off-site doctor's prescription before they will dispense
medications.12 These sites are regulated under conventional food and
drug Iaws,13 and will thus not be the focus of this Note. "Prescribingbased" sites, on the other hand, circumvent the traditional models of
prescription drug distribution. These types of sites further can be categorized as either Online Consultation or International Freelance
sites. Online Consultation sites require customers to complete a brief
medical questionnaire online, usually involving general physical information and details of concomitant medication use, which is then reviewed by the site's physician, who issues the prescription for the
requested drug.t4 The medication is then shipped directly by the site
to the consumer.IS Usually, little information is available about the
physician's qualifications, with some sites disclosing only that their
10 See Sarah A Webster, Internet Drug Sales Investigated: Critics Raise Wamiog
About Health Risks of Online Prescriptions, Detroit News, JUDe 7,1999, at AI, available
in 1999 WL 3927805.
11 See Sbari Roan, Your Friendly Neigh~orhood E·Drugstore: lbe New Online Pharmacies Offer Prompt. Hassle-Free Service, but Health Experts Worry lbat the Sites Also
Pose Serious Potential for Misuse, LA. 11Dles, Sept 20, 1999, at SI (differentiating between "pbarmacy-based" and "prescribing-based" sites).
12 See id. (describing how pharmacy-based sites operate). For CXl1DlpJes of pharmacybased sites, see CVS Online Pharmacy Store (visited Sept 17,2000) <bUp:l/w\Yw.a'S.colD>;
Drugstore.com (visited Sept 17, 2000) <http://www.drugstore.colD>; PlnnctRx Oullnc
Pharmacy & Drugstore (visited SepL 17,2000) <http://www.plnnctrx.com>.
13 See Roan. supra note 11, at SI (writing that pharmacy·based sites are "legitimate
[and] state-licensed"). Pharmacy-based sites require paticnts to send prescriptions to the
website or will contact directly patients' doctors for prescriptions bcfore dispeosiog medication, much like mail-order pharmacies. They are regulated under the existing Jaws and
regulations for mail-order pharmacies. See generally Gregory S. Munro, Regulation of
Mail-Order Pharmacy, 12 J. Legal Med. 1 (1991) (describing Jaws and regulations governing maU.-order pharmacies).
14 See Bemard S. Bloom & Ronald C. Iannacone, Intemct Availability of Prescription
Pharmaceuticals to the Pub6c, 131 ADnals Intemal Med. 830, 831-32 (1999) (dctaUiog Ofdering process); Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (same); Hcrman, supra note 7, at Z14
(same). For examples of On6ne Consultation sites, see 24 Hour Vlllgra and Ptopecia
Clinic (visited Sept 17,2000) <http://www.24houroullnedrugs.com>; Doctors 2000 (visited
Sept 17, 2000) <http-JIwww.worldrx.com>; K\VikMed (visited SepL 17, 2000) <http://
www.kwikmed.com>; Lifestyle USA (visited Sept 17,2000) <http://w\Vw.liCestyleUS3.colD>;
Procare Clinic for Men (visited Sept 17,2000) <hUp:l/www.procarecliDic.com>; ViagrnOrders (visited Sept 17, 2000) <http://www.futuredrugsemces.com>.
IS See Lauran Neergaard, Playing Doctor: ODIine Pharmacies Allow PC Users to Skip
the Physical, Newsday,Jan. 6,1999, at C3 (discussiog types of drugs shippecl from prescribing-based sites).
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physicians are licensed in foreign countries. 16 International Freelance
sites are based outside the United States. They do not require a prescription to order medication and do not offer physician consultation,11 Both types of prescribing-based sites generally include a
waiver where the consumer releases the site from tort liability by
clicking the "1 AGREE" button. IS
Prescribing-based sites afford the consumer around-the-clock
availability and privacy as well as the promise of lower costs due to
their reduced operating overhead.19 By eliminating face-to-face visits
16 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32 (describing lack of information
available from prescribing-based sites regarding prescribing physicians). For examples of
sites where the physicians reviewing the online questionnaire are licensed in foreign countries, see M.E.D. Clinic (visited Sept. 17,2000) <http://www.ukyes.com> (U.K.); Norfolk
Men's Clinic (visited July 5, 2000) <http://www.viagra.au.com> (Rom.); Pharmcom (visited
Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.pharmcom.coIIl> (N.Z.).
17 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32 (discussing International Freelance
sites). For an example of a website that does not require an online consultation, see 4nRx
(visited Sept. 12,2000) <http://www.4nrx.com>; see also DrugQuest (visited Sept. 12, 2000)
<http://www.drugquest.COIIl> (Internet portal that enables users to purchase prescription
medications from foreign pharmacies without prescription).
18 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831. For examples of these waivers, see 2
Buy Viagra (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.nethealthprescriptions.comlorder.html>; 24
Hour Viagra and Propecia Clinic (visited July S, 2000) <http://
www.24houronlinedrugs.comlviagra_waiver.html>; Online Physicians (visited July 5, 2000)
<http://www.onlinephysicians.netlviagra/consult1.htm>. These types of waivers are termed
click-wrap agreements. For a thorough explanation of click-wrap agreements, see Jerry C.
Liu et aI., Electronic Commerce: Using Clickwrap Agreements, Computer Law., Dec.
1998, at 10. This Note will not focus on the enforceability of these click-wrap waivers,
though courts historically have viewed negligence disclaimers with much skepticism. See
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale LJ. 899, 911 (1994) (noting that
courts haye tendency to override explicit waivers, especially in health care settings); Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 Am. J.L. & Med.
327,361-62 & 362 n.282 (1999) (discussing cases where disclaimers have been invalidated
in health care provider situations).
This Note also will not focus on the direct liability of the prescribing-based sites themselves. Though injured plaintiffs likely will sue both the website and the manufacturer, it is
assumed that most plaintiffs will focus primarily on the manufacturers' liability due to their
greater financial resources. For a more thorough explanation of this so-called "deep pock.
ets" mentality, see Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who
Wms in Cook County Jury 1iials at vii (1985) (finding that corporate and health care provider defendants had to pay more than individual defendants paid for similar injuries);
Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 12 (1988) ("If the
new tort system cannot find a careless defendant after an accident, it will often settle for a
merely wealthy one."). But see Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets
Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 Duke
W. 217, 262-63 (1993) (finding no support for deep pockets effect).
19 See Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 (observing that virtual pbarmacies offer "consumers the option of making purchases at any time without having to leave home ••• [and] ship
products directly from central distributors to customers, avoiding the overhead costs of a
real storefront"); Roan, supra note 11, at Sl (noting that "online pharmacies hope to lower
overhead costs and pass on lower prices to consumers").

November 2000]

ONLINE PRESCRIBING

1457

to physicians and pharmacists, however, such sites may expose consumers to possible adverse drug reactions and other health risks.20
The recent explosion of prescribing-based sites has state and federal authorities grappling with difficult enforcement issues. At the
federal level, the reaction has been one of bewilderment Although it
is usually a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for Americans to order medications from a foreign country,21 the law is extremely difficult to enforce.22 In fact, Americans have been buying
drugs illegally from overseas mail-order catalogs for years, albeit in
much more limited numbers.23 Recently, Representative Ron Klink
introduced a bill that would require all online pharmacies to post
identifying information about their doctors, pharmacists, and office
addresses.24 President Clinton also has proposed legislation requiring
20 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that there is "DO way of knO\\ing if the
patient is answering the questions truthfully, or if a physical examination would reveal a
more serious condition"); Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("Critics worry that without a face·
to-face meeting with a doctor, customers can easily lie about their age and health status in
order to get the regulated products they want ••••"); Roan, supra Dote 11. at SI (indicating
that American Medical Association believes that "risks in using these prescribing sites are
overwhelming"); Webster, supra note 10, at A1 (writing that federal and state officials are
"worried about the health risks to people ordering drugs without a doctor's visit or a pbar~
macist's review of potential drug interactions"); see also Bloom & Ianuacone, supra Dote
14, at 833 (arguing that giving incorrect or false information to obtain prescription from
one of these sites was "indirectly facilitated by preselected click~(f choices a..'3i1able to the
purchaser").
21 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.c. § 381 (1994) (mandating that if
imported drug appears to be (1) manufactured under unsaoilaIy conditions, (2) forbidden
or restricted in sale in the exporting couotry, or (3) adulterated or misbranded, sueb drug
"shall be refused admission").
22 See American Med. Ass'o, Internet Prescribing, Board of'Ih1stees Report No. 3S-A99 (1999) <http://www.ama~assn.orglmeetiogs/publiclanouaI99/reportslonsiteJbotlrlfl
bot3S.rtf> [hereinafter Report of the AMA] (DOting that Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has authority to prevent illegal purchase of prescription drugs overseas. but its effectiveness has been "extremely limited"); Neergaard, supra Dote 15, at C3 (writing that
FDA "tries to stop shipments at the border but is largely unsuccessful"); Roben Pear,
Ooline Sales Spur megal Importing of Medicine to U.S., N.Y. TIDles, .Tan. 10.2000, at At
(noting that intercepting imported prescription drugs is CA1remely diUicult); New Diet
Drug Sets Off Medical Frenzy on Internet, Chi. nib. (eveDing ed.), May 24. 1999. at 7
[hereinafter New Diet Drug1 (same).
Complicating the issue further. the FDA allows for the importation of certain quantities of medication for personal use, even those not approved in the U.S. See Food & Drug
Admin., FDAlORA Regulatory Procedures Manual cb. 9 (rev. May 12.1998). available al
<http://www.fda.gov/oralcompUanceJeflrpm-.new2lcb9pers.btml>..Ibis exception is subject to various limitations. See Benten v. Kessler, 799 F. Supp. 281. 284-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(explaining "personal use exception" and limitations thereof)•
• 23 See Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 (quoting Bill Hubbard. acting deputy commissioner for poliey at FDA, saying: "'We've always bad these catalogues wbere people could
buy from overseas, but it was a very small market .......); New Diet Drug. supra note 22,
at 7.
24 See Internet Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act, RR. 2763. 106th Cong. (1999).
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online pharmacies to receive federal certification from the Federal
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to dispense medication over the Web.2S However, since policing Internet prescribing
would involve the FDA, Federal Thade Commission (FI'C), Customs
Service, Postal Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
states, no single agency has clear authority to address the issue uniformly.26 In fact, members of the House Commerce Committee recently complained in a letter to the FDA that "the federal effort
appears uncoordinated and disorganized . . . [and] it remains unclear .
which federal agencies or departments are in charge, or what the responsibilities are for each agency."27 Perhaps as a result of these difficulties, the FDA has indicated that the private sector, as well as state

25 The Internet Prescription Drug Sale Act of 2000 was transmitted jointly to the Houso
Committees on Commerce and the Judiciary from the Secretary of Health and Human
Services on June 9, 2000. See 146 Cong. Rec. H4173 (daily ed. June 9,2000); see also Amy
Goldstein, FDA Bids to Control Online Drug Sales, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1999, at At
(describing Clinton's proposal); Robert Pear, Controls Sought for Drug Sales on the Internet, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 28, 1999, at Al (same); cf. Naftali Bendavid, Plan to Regulate
Over-the-Web Drug Sales Draws Fae. Chi. nib.• Dec. 29. 1999. § 1, at 1 (arguing that
expanding regulation in this area may not be well received).
26 Guidelines for prescription drugs are set out under the Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360ee (1994). The FDA has primary jurisdiction over drug
labeling (prescription and over-the-counter) and over the advertising and promotion of
prescription drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-352. 393 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The FfC has
primary jurisdiction over over-the-counter drug advertising and can block dissemination of
false or misleading advertising. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 41. 52-53 (1994). Neither agency has
indicated whether Internet marketing of drugs constitutes advertising, labeling, or both.
See Kristen Green. Note, Marketing Health Care Products on the Internet: A Proposal for
Updated Federal Regulations. 24 AID. J.L. & Med. 365. 367 (1998). Doctors, pharmacists.
and pharmacies are licensed by state boards of medicine and of pharmacy and must follow
guidelines set out thereby. See. e.g.• Fla. Stat. Ann. § 465.001·.187 (West 1998) (phar.
macy); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.301-.349 (1998) (Physicians); Ind. Code Ann. § 25-26-13·1 to
-29 (West 1999) (pharmacy); Ind Code § 25-22.5-1-1.1 to -22.5-8 (1999) (physicians): Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4729.01-.18 (West 2000) (pharmacy); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.01·
.143 (West 2000) (Physicians); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1·3300 to -3319 (Michie 2000) (pharmacy); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2900 to -2941 (Michie 2000) (physicians); Wis. Stat. § 450.01.18 (1998) (pharmacy); WIS. Stat. § 448.01-.40 (1998) (physicians). Each state has established a Medical Practice Act that defines the process and procedures for granting a health
professional license. renewing a license. and regulating medical practice within the state.
See U.S. Dep't of Comm., 'Thlemedicine Repo~ to Congress (Jan. 31. 1997) [hereinafter
'Thlemedicine]. available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/telemedllegal.htm>. Controlling illegal importation of drugs involves the Customs Service, the Postal Service. and the
Drug Enforcement Administration. See Drugstores on the Net: The Benefits and Risks of
On-Line Pharmacies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Commerce. 106th Cong. 101 (1999) [hereinafter Drugstores on the
Net] (statement of Janet Woodcock. M.D.• Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA).
'D Robert Cohen, Regulation of Drugs Unraveling on the Web: Authorities Struggle to
Rein in Business. Star-Ledger (Newark. NJ.). July 6. 1999, at 1.
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licensing and medical boards, would better be equipped to police prescribing-based sites than the federal govemment.28
Current state regulations, however, are premised on traditional
conceptions of prescription drug distribution that fail to address the
Internet prescribing problem. "Under existing law in the majority of
states, prescribing prescription drugs to a patient outside the state
where the physician is licensed is considered the unlicensed practice of
medicine."29 In addition, most states' laws require licensed doctors to
establish a physician-patient relationship before prescribing drugs to
that patient.30 But since doctors, patients, and websites can all be

28 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 95 (statement of Janet Woodcock) ("In
the context of prescription drug sales over the Internet, government should encourage pri.
vate sector leadership in achieving a safe marketplace."); Charles Marwick, Several
Groups Attempting Regulation of Internet Rx, 281 lAMA 975, 97S (1999) (noting that
"[t]he [FDA] views obtaining prescription drugs without the personal interaction of p:ltient
and physician as a significant problem but believes that it is one better handled by Slale
licensing and medical boards than by the FDA").
In July 1999, the FDA adopted an Internet Sales Action Plan. See E·Drugs: Who
Regulates Internet Pharmacies? Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Jane Eo Henney. MoD.. Commissioner of Food and Drugs. FDA) [hereinafter Senate Testimony], available at <http://
www.fda.gov/olal2000/pharmsales.btml>. The plan includes increased public and proCessional outreach, coordinating state and federal agencies as weD as international agencies,
monitoring websites involved in drug sales. and sending warning letters to websites. See id.
29 Report of the AMA, supra note 22. at 3; accord 1Clemedicine. SUpl'll note 26 ("In
virtually all situations ••• the state has required an out-of·state ph)'Sician to obtain a full
and unrestricted license before consulting directly with patients in the state."); JuUe M.
Kearney, Comment, Telemedicine: Ringing in a New Em of Health Care Delivery, 5 CommLaw Conspectus 289, 297 (1997) ("[M]ost states require a pbysician to obtain a fulllicense in order to practice within that state."); Neergaard, supm note 15. at C3 ("It is illegal
for doctors to prescribe for patients in a state where they're not licensed to Pl'llctice."); see
also Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 256 (statement of Herman I. Abromov.ill,
M.D•• American Medical Association) (expressing concem over dangerous Internet presenDing and encouraging state legislatures and licensing boards to work towards appropriate regulation); Alissa R. Spielberg. Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient
Communication by Electronic MaD. 25 Am. J.L & Med. 267, 291 (1999) (considering
states' options for licensure of doctors engaged in telemedicine).
30 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2242(a) (West 2000) ("PresaibiDg ••• without a
good faith prior examination and medical indication therefor, constitutes unprofessional
conduct."); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 334.100(2)(4)(h) (West 2000) (noting that b03rd may IDe complaint against any pbysician who prescribes drugs "without sufficient examination"); see
also Report of the AMA, supra note 22 ("[Elvery state medical board agrees that prescribing drugs without physically examining a patient or reviewing his or her medical records is,
in most cases. practicing medicine at a level far belo\v the acceptable standard of medical
care."); Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("States require licensed doctors to meet a 'standard
of care' for a physician-patient relationship that includes personal interaction."): Neergaard, supra note 1S. at C3 ("Licensed doctors ••• must meet standards of care that in most
states require a patient relationship to prescribe drugs.").
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based in different states, state boards of pharmacy and medicine are
unfortunately ill-equipped to police Internet prescribing.31
In a piecemeal attempt to regulate these sites, a few states have
taken action. Illinois passed a law requiring any Internet site that
ships to a patient in the state to have an Illinois pharmacy license;32
Nevada's Board of Medical Examiners barred its doctors from making
Internet sales unless they actually see the patient;33 medical boards in
WISconsin and Colorado have disciplined doctors who prescribed
medications to patients they never examined;34 and other states currently are investigating these sites.35 Enforcement is confounded,
however, by the fact that few of these sites reveal their geographic
location, let alone specific identifying information about their physicians.36 In fact, very few doctors or pharmacists have been sanctioned
for Internet prescribing.37
The private sector has also moved to address this thorny issue.
The American Medical Association (AMA) has approved a resolution
aimed at discouraging doctors from writing prescriptions through an
Internet consultation.38 Pfizer Inc., the maker of Viagra, has filed a
complaint with the FTC seeking to stop the prescribing of Viagra
without adequate safeguards. Pfizer complains that the online questionnaires used by prescribing-based sites do not adequately convey
the risks of concomitant use of nitrates, and fail to discover underlying
medical problems that remain undiagnosed because of the lack of a
31 See Senate Testimony, supra note 28 ("[M]ost drug sales websites are actually made
up of multiple related sites and links, thereby making investigations much more complex
and resource intensive."); Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that state medical and
pharmacy boards are "poorly equipped to deal with cyberspace, where a patient in one
state can order pills from a druggist in another state, with the prescription often written by
a doctor in a third").
32 See 22S Dl. Comp. Stat. 85/16-a (West Supp. 2000).
33 See Herman, supra Dote 7, at Z14.
34 See id.
3S See Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 5 (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, lUiDOis, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming); Hermnn, supra note 7,
at Z14 (WISconsin and Colorado); Neergaard, supra note 15, at C3 (Connecticut, Wyo-ming, New Jersey, and Kansas).
36 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32.
37 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 ("[As of June 16, 1999,] fewer than ten doctors
nationwide, and few if any pharmacists, have been disciplined for prescribing over the
Intemet").
38 See American Medical Association Resolution 832, Guidelines for Medical Practice
Through the Internet (visited July 8, 2000) <http://www.ama-assn.orgfmeetingsipublicJannual99/reportslonsitelrtflh832.rtf> (stating that "physician[s] should refrain from writing
prescriptions for medication resulting only from a sale or consultation over the intemet");
Cohen, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing shortcomings of formal regulation).
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physical exam.3~ Pfizer has also contacted all state medical boards,
asking them to remind doctors that it is improper to prescribe Viagra
without examining the patient.40 Drug manufacturers like Pfizer are
right to be deeply concerned about the inadequate safeguards implemented by prescribing-based sites, since they will not be able to plead
ignorance of these inadequacies if sued. By law, manufacturers are
"presumed to possess an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials,
and processes of the pharmaceutical business."41 This knowledge includes a familiarity with the distribution and administration of their
products.42 Though obtaining prescription medication through foreign-based websites might be illegal, a line of cases holds that manufacturers must anticipate all reasonably foreseeable uses and misuses
of their products.43 Accordingly, manufacturers can ill afford to wait
39 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 253 (statement or Herman I.
Abromowitz); Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 3.
40 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § I, at 1; Roan, supra note 11, at 51.
41 Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974); cr. Navarro \'. Fuji Henvy
Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating tbat:
The fact that as a Japanese firm it may not have known much about Chicago
driving conditions is irrelevant •••• Fuji intended to sell its cars in the Chicago
area and is therefore charged with whatever knowledge can rcasonably be imputed to automobile manufacturers, wherever located. desiring to servo that
market.)
42 See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348. 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Prescription
drug manufacturers are charged with knowledge of the distribution system in which their
products are sold."); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277 (stating that drug manufacturers must be
familiar "with practices and knowledge common in the drug industry as to distribution and
administration of pharmaceutical products").
43 See, e.g., Gregory v. C"tncinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 32S, 329 (Mich. 1995) (stating that
duty to warn includes foreseeable misuses); Darsan v. Gunca1ito Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 594.
596 (App. Div.1989) ("A manufacturer has a duty to wam or dangers associated \\ith the
reasonably foreseeable misuse of its producL" (citations omitted»; Tanner Y. Shoupe. 596
N.W.2d 805,816-17 (WIS. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that whethcr battcry was defective due
to failure to warn against foreseeable misuse was issue for jury); see also Swa)'le v. McNeil
Lab., Inc., 8rt1 F.2d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 1987) (Goldberg, J., disscnting) ("[B]oth law and
morality require McNeil [a pharmaceutical manufacturer] to monitor and cnsure that the
products it manufactures and markets are Dot generaUy used in an unrcasonably dangerous
fashion. If this entails some pressure to avoid deaths that McNeil can provent, McNeil is
required to do no less."). But see Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305. 320 (3d CU'.
1999) ("LP]laintiff can cite no authority (and we can find none) under either New Jersey or
New York law which supports the existence of a duty to warn middlemen that consumers.
after purchasing their products, may alter the products and harm third parties."); Gaines'Thbb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 625 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[D]ercndants bad
no duty to warn the suppUers of its product of possible criminal misuse.").
It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine whether a court indeed would decide
whether ordering a prescription drug from an International Freelance site was reasonably
foreseeable and thus apply failure-ta-warn liability. In fact. a court in such a situation may
hold the plaintiff contributorily negligenL Suffice it to say that it is unchartcd territory IlDd
the very possibility of such lawsuits should spur manufacturers to take heed.
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for the government to take action to regulate these sites.44 Even if
federal and state regulations were successful in inhibiting United
States~based Online Consultation sites, foreign~based Online Consultation sites and International Freelance sites hardly would be
affected.4s
Internet prescribing in its current state presents the courts with a
scenario beyond the reach of the learned intermediary doctrine. With
no discernible learned intermediary to rely upon, the courts will be
forced to assign the duty to warn the patient to manufacturers, leaving
them open to tremendous liability unless effective warnJngs are
provided.46
44 Government regulations may not be the most effective way to police this burgeoning
phenomenon. RegUlations will be unable to reach International Freelance websites. Sec
Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 99 (statement of Janet Woodcock) ("The most
difficult problem to address is the online sale of drugs to U.S. residents by sellers in foreign
countries."); Bendavid, supra note 25, at N1 ("There is at least one large group that for
now will remain beyond the reach of regulators: foreign Web sites."); Pent, supra note 25,
at Al (same).
Many fear that additional regulations will stifle Internet innovations. See Jolm Henkel, Buying Drugs Online: It's Convenient and Private, but Beware of 'Rogue Siles,' FDA
Consumer, Jan.-Feb. 2000, available in FDA Consumer <http://www.fda.gov/fdaclfeaturesl
2000/100_online.html> ("Certain pharmacy industry representatives oppose legislation or
additional powers for regulatory agencies on the premise that current laws are sufficient to
address the problem. H); Marilyn Werber Serafini, Drugs on the Web, 31 Nat'l J. 3281, 3311·
12,3314 (1999) (detailing tepid reaction to additional regulation of Internet prescribing by
legislators and industry alike); see also Jeri Clausing, Internet Makes an Easy Thrget for
Lobbyists and Lawmakers, N.Y. TlDles, Nov. 22, 1999, at C1 (arguing that "evolving tech~
nolo81 could eliminate the need for rules over domain names disputes and problems liko
spam").
45 See Enforcing the Laws on Internet Pharmaceutical Sales: Wbere Are the Peds?
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, l06th Cong. (2000) (statement of William K. Hubbard, Senior Associate Commissioner for Policy, Planning and Legislation, FDA) [hereinafter Hubbard 1Cstimony],
available at <http://www.fda.gov/olal2000rmtemetsales.html> (stating that:
[The] FDA confronts the same obstacles facing other U.S. regulatory and law
enforcement agencies seeking to hold foreign actors accountable for violations
of Federal law. FDA efforts are mostly limited to requesting the foreign government to take action against the seDer of the product, or asking the U.S.
Customs Service ••• to stop the imported drug at a U.S. port-of-entry.);
Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("The World Health Organization has considered the
problems of Internet drug sales, but international action is nearly impossible because of
different prescription standards in each country."); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing difficulty in policing international websites).
This problem is not limited to prescription drugs. Various foreign gambling websites
have been established to evade U.S. jurisdiction. See Mark G. natos, Gaming on the
Internet, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fm. 101, 107 (1997) ("[MJany virtual gaming operators who
are beginning to offer services on the Internet are setting up their operations outside the
United States ••• to avoid criminal prosecution by being located physically outside of the
jurisdiction of federal authorities. ").
46 The liability assigned to prescription manufacturers in the absence of the learned
intermediary rule will be discussed further, see infra Part D.C.l.b.
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IT
CIRCUMVENTING THE LEARNED INmRMEDIARY:

CoNSEQUENCES OF INrERNET PRESCRIBING

A. The Learned Intermediary Rille
The learned intermediary rule limits a prescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn to "an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers that may result from the drug's use."47
By warning the doctor, the manufacturer relieves itself of any duty to
warn the users of its products directly.48 As the Fifth Circuit
explained:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines. esoteric in
formula and varied in effect. As a medical e"l'ert, the prescribing
physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well
as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the
benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice
he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.49
Proponents of the learned intermediary rule stress that it is based on
"a desire not to intrude upon or disturb the well-established doctorpatient relationship."SO Therefore, a physician, using her individualized medical judgment, should be entrusted ,vith selecting the correct
medication for each patient and specifically tailoring the warnings to
him or her. Furthermore, courts have assumed that detailed side-effect information would in fact deter patients from taking the medication at all, despite their physician's best judgment.S1 Advocates of the
41 Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Or. 1974); see also Restatement
('Ihird) of Torts: Products J..iability § 6(d) (1997).
.
48 See, e.g.. Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab•• 731 F.2d 1575, 1579-80 (11th Cir.
1984) (upholding learned intermediary rule); Mauldin v. Upjohn Co•• 697 F.2d 644, 647
(5th eir. 1983) (holding that manufacturer discharged duty to warn by adequately warning
physician); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 661 (1st Or. 1981) (stating that
manufacturer must warn physician. not patient, of risks involved with prescription drugs);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, as (8th Or. 1966) (noting that "doctor is a
learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer"). "Ibis is an exception
to the general rule that manufacturers must warn all foreseeable ultimate users of their
products of all dangers inherent within them. See Restatement (Third) ofTorlS: Products
Liability § 2(e) (1997).
49 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276.
so Nancy K. Plant, The Leamed Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an
Old Ailment, 81 Iowa L Rev. 1007, 1015 (1996); accord Swayze v. McNeil Lab.. Inc.. 807
F.2d 464, 471 (5th Or. 1987) (noting that "warnings would only lead to confusion, and
perhaps undermine the physician.patient relationship"): Dunkin v. Syntex Lab•• Inc., 443
F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (stating that detailed wamiags to patients might "in·
terfere with the physicianlpatient relationship").
S1 See, e.g.. McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045,1055 (Wasb.1989)
(writing that detailed information "may confuse and frighten the patient"); Lars Noah.
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rule also argue that it would be extremely difficult to fashion written
warnings that are easily understood by lay people, yet sufficiently
comprehensive to cover all of the possible side-effects, which are "inherently varied, complex, and dependent upon an individual patient's
susceptibilities."S2 Even if devising an adequate warning were possible, pharmaceutical manufacturers must further ensure that it would
reach patients who often neither receive the drug in its original packaging nor have any significant direct contact with the manufacturer. 53

B.

The Learned Intermediary Rule Revisited

The learned intermediary rule is premised on traditional conceptions of the ideal physician-patient relationship-a relationship that
has been eroded heavily by the realities of our modern health care
system. Today's managed care organizations often prevent patients
from establishing long term relationships with physicians and usually
provide patients with shorter consultations.54 Numerous FDA studies
Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Is·
sues, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 141, 157 (1997) (noting that "warnings that contradict information
supplied by the physician will undermine the patient's trust in tbe pbysician's judgment"):
Plant, supra note SO, at 1015 (same); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescrip·
tion Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 829,
830 (1991) (same); Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and
Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1347 (1999) (same).
52 Paytash, supra note 51, at 1347; see also Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th
Cir. 1989) (stating that "the information regarding risks is often too technical for a patient
to make a reasonable choice"); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227,1232 (4th Cir.
1984) (noting that direct warnings to patient would be "almost inevitably involved and
longwinded"); Plant, supra note SO, at 1039-49 (describing rigorous requirements courts
have imposed for adequate patient warnings); Charles J. Walsh et al.,1be Learned Inter·
mediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 821,
839 (1996) ("Given the educational and social differences among consumers, it is difficult if
not impossible to draft patient labeling which win be beneficial to all users.").
53 See Plant, supra note 50. at 1015, 1049; Barbara MarticelU McGarey, Comment,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer·Directed Information-Enhancing the
Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 117, 147 (1984). Manufacturers usu·
ally ship their products in bulk containers to the dispensing pharmacy. The pharmacy repackages the medication in the quantity prescribed by the phYSician and dispenses it to the
patient. This will be discussed further, see infra Part ILC.l.a.
54 See Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, l2SS (NJ. 1999) (noting that since
"managed care has reduced the time allotted per patient, physicians have considerably less
time to inform patients of the risks and benefits of a drug"); Plant, supra note SO, at 1024·
2S ("Patients enrolled in managed care organizations ••• may be less likely to develop a
long-term relationship with a single physician ••• [and] are likely to spend less time with
physicians."). As of 1995. 78% of all privately insured Americans were members of managed care plans. See Rand B. Rosenblatt et al., Law and the American Health Care Sys.
tem 544 (1997). Likewise, over 80% of practicing physicians are employed by, or have
entered into at least one contractual arrangement with, a managed care plan. See id. at
557.
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have shown that "most patients either do not receive information
about prescription drugs from their doctors or, if they do ••• , they
often do not understand it or forget it after leaving the office."ss Additionally, managed care organizations increasingly have usurped physicians' traditional discretion in prescribing decisions.s6 As a result,
the patient's best interests are often compromised in the face of many
other competing interests.51 Nonetheless, the learned intermediary
rule remains widely accepted throughout the judiciary.s8 Because preSS Schwartz, supra note 51, at 831 n.14. For a complete list of these studies, see 45 Fed.
Reg. 60,754-56 (1980).
S6 See Rosenblatt et aI., supra note 54, at 568 ("~fanaged care plans] use prospecth'c
utilization review techniques as well as practice guidelines to control physician utilization
of resources. Managed care contracts with physicians typically include provisions "'csting
total discretion in the plan to make medical necessity determinations."); Plant, supra note
50, at 1026-27 (noting that managed care plans have established formularies (i.e., lists of
drugs that are covered by plan) of preferred drugs. required prior authorization before
prescribing drugs not on formulary, required substitution of generic drugs, used monetary
incentives for physicians to use cheaper drugs, and established protocols that require use of
drugs in particular order). Managed care plans often threaten physicians uitb exclusion
from their provider network (thus eliminating the physician's patient base) to compel compliance with these utilization standards. See Rosenblatt et al. supra note 54, at 559. Finally, some managed care plans reward doctors who provide or arrange for less care. See
id. at 564.
Managed care plans have come under increasing attack for '\TongfuUy superseding
doctors' decision-making authority. See Herdrich v. Pegram. 154 F.3d 362, 376 (7th C"U'.
1998) (noting that "[i]n order to minimize health care costs and faUen corporate profits for
HMOs, primary care physicians face severe restrictions on referrals and diagnostic tcsts.
and at the same time, must contend with ever-shrinking incomes"). rcv'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143
(2000); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625. 629 (8th eir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff had right
to know that HMO was "offering financial incentives that could have colored his doctor's
medical judgement"); Plant, supra note 50, at 1023 ("Prescribing decisions are increasingly
made or significantly affected by parties other than physicians, most notably third·party
payors.n); Amy Goldstein, How HMOs Became the Enemy, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1999. at
At (detaiIing complaints levied against HMOs); David E. Rosenbaum, House Hears Grim
Tales About Managed Care, N.Y. TlDles. Oct. 8. 1999. at A23 (same). But sec Milt
Freudenheim, Big H.M.O. to Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors, N.Y. TUDCS. Noy. 9.
1999, at A1 (noting that United Health Group is allowing doctors to make treatment decisions without first consulting insurer). The House of Representatives recently passed a
bilJ, H.R.,2723, 106th Cong. (1999). sharply Umiting the ability of HMOs to enforce drug
formularies and dictate treatment options. See 145 Cong. Rec. 89635-36 (dally ed. Oct. 7,
1999); see also Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Expand Rights on Medicn1 Care. N.Y.
TJDles, Oct. 8,1999, at A1 (describing bill).
S1 See Plant, supra note 50, at 1031 ("[I]t is erroneous to maintain that the ph)'Sician is
the sole decisionmaker regarding what drug is prescribed and that the doctor makes this
decision based solely on what is best for the patient.n). But see Walsh et at. supra note 52,
at ff/7 n.211 ("rrJhere will be attempts to defeat the learned intermediiU)' doctrine •••
because the physician no longer has the freedom to prescribe what is best for the patient •••• l.N]otwithstanding the restrictions these plans place on physician autonomy. the
doctor's independent medical judgement should be sufficient to defeat such daims.").
58 See Noah, supra note 51, at 161 ("[110 date no jurisdiction has completely abandoned the learned intermediary rule ••••n). There are Umited exceptions to the learned
intermediary rule. Some courts have held it inapplicable at mass immunization clinics.
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scription drugs serve an essential role in the health of our society and
because in most cases existing physician-patient relationships can still
provide more effective warnings than the manufacturer can give,S9 arguably, without the protection of the learned intermediary rule, manufacturers simply would cease to produce prescription medications
because the duty to warn consumers directly would be too onerous a
burden for them to sustain.60 In sum, the learned intermediary rule
See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that vac·
cine is "dispensed without the sort of individualized medical balancing of the risks to the
vaccinee that is contemplated by the prescription drug exception"); Davis v. Wyeth Lab.,
Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that "although the drug was denominated a
prescription drug it was not dispensed as such"). These cases have been reversed to some
extent by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300an-1 to -34
(1994). The Act created a federal no-fault compensation scheme to compensate individuals injured as a result of anyone of seven compulsory childhood vaccines. Alternatively,
plaintiffs can choose to pursue a tort claim, but cannot base a claim on a failure to provide
direct warnings to an injured party.
One court has refused to apply the learned intermediary rule to oral contraceptives.
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass. 1985) (noting that patients are actively involved in birth control decisions, resulting in limited roles for doctor).
For other examples of courts that have recognized the oral contraceptive exception, see
Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F.
Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich.
1985). Odgers and Stephens were recently criticized as an incorrect statement of Michigan
law in Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Hill was
repudiated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608,
614 (Ark. 1991).
A recent salvo against the learned intermediary rule was fired by the New Jersey Su·
preme Court in Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). The court declared
that "[c]onsumer.directed advertising of pharmaceuticals .•• belies each of the premises on
which the learned intermediary doctrine rests" and concluded that pharmaceutical manufactUrers who utilize direct·to-consumer advertisements also must provide adequate warnings to the consumer within those advertisements. ld. at 1256-57. Courts continue to
disagree over whether the learned intermediary rule should be applicable in the face of
direct·to-consumer advertising; indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that
its decision was in direct conflict with a contemporaneous one by the Fifth Circuit. See id.
at 1256 ("We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit recently held that under Thxas law, the
learned intermediary doctrine does apply in the context of Norplant."). Compare id., with
Harrison v. American Home Prods. Corp. (In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Linb. Litig.), 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that, although manufacturer was engaged in
aggressive marketing, "as long as a physician·patient relationship exists, the learned intermediary doctrine applies").
59 This will be discussed further, see infra Part ItC.l.a.
60 See Harrison, 165 F.3d at 379 ("Our understanding of the rationale of the learned
intermediary doctrine, at least in substantial part, is that it seeks to encourage the drug
manufacturer to make available prescription drugs despite potentially harmful side effects."); Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259 ("(M]anufacturers are not made guarantors against re·
motely possible, but not scientifically-verifiable, side.effects of prescription drugs, a result
that could have a 'significant anti-utilitarian effect'''); Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Refonn 461,
467 (1997) (writing that product liability claims can cause drug manufacturers to stop re·
search and development, unnecessarily delay new drugs, or withdraw beneficial drugs);
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might be viewed as a rough judicial compromise between the commercial interests of the manufacturers, the practical advantages of the
wide availability of prescription medications, and the health and
safety of patients.
Courts facing Internet prescribing-related injury claims, however,
will find it difficult to apply the learned intermediary rule." It is
widely recognized that the learned intermediary rule should not apply
when drugs are dispensed in the absence of a health care provider.6z
Prescribing-based sites fall squarely within such a situation. In the
best case scenario, a prescription drug is mailed directly to the patient's home on the basis of the patient's answers to a brief online
questionnaire that supposedly was reviewed by an unseen physician.
At worst, using an International Freelance site, the patient orders the
medication without even going through the pretense of an online consultation and without ever obtaining a prescription. It is doubtful that
even at an Online Consultation site, any health care professional balances the risks and the benefits of specific medications for individual
patients as originally envisioned by the learned intermediary rule. As
a result, manufacturers are left with the duty to provide risk information directly to any patient that obtains their medications in this
fashion.

C. Conveying Adequate Warnings Directly to the Patient
The most common proposal to convey adequate warnings directly
from manufacturer to patient is through the Patient Package Insert
(pPI).63 PPIs are leaflets directly distributed with prescription drugs
to the patient that describe in lay language the drug's indications, directions for use, and side effects. The FDA currently only requires
Walsh et aL, supra note 52, at 823 (arguing that "imposing liability ror inadequnte patient
warnings could adversely affect the availability and affordabllity o[ socially beneficial
medicines").
61 See Terry, supra note 18, at 346 (notiDg that manufacturers who use web marketing
circumvent learned intermediary).
.
61 See Restatement ('Ibird) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(d) (1997). The drafting
committee took pains to note that "direct warnings and instructions to patients are warranted for drugs that are dispensed or administered to patients without the personal intervention or evaluation of a health-care provider." Id. at § 6 cmL e; see also Reyes, 498 F.2d
at 1276 ("rrJhe manufacturer of a prescription drug who knows or has reason to know that
it will not be dispensed as such a drug must provide the consumer \vith adequate wormation so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given medication himselL").
63 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1032-38 (describing development of patient package inserts (PP1s»; Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 (notiDg that courts should consider requiring
PPIs for advertised drugs); McGarey, supra note 53, at 14849 (indicating that manufacturers should be obligated statutorily to include PPIs \vith their drugs); Paytasb, supra note 51,
at 1368 (proposing FDA-mandated program of PPIs).
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that PPIs be distributed with a small group of medications, including
oral contraceptives,64 estrogens,6S progestational drug products,66 and
certain asthma inhalers,67 due to the high degree of patient involve..
ment in the decision whether to use such medications, together with
the potential for severe complications. 68 In 1995, the FDA proposed a
rule requiring drug manufacturers to include "useful" patient informa..
tion with seventy-five percent of new prescriptions by 2000 and
ninety-five percent by 2006.69 Since adequate patient information for
pharmaceuticals is currently produced for a limited number of medications, and indeed, extensive patient information has even been incorporated into prescription drug advertisements,7° PPIs seem at first
glance to be an adequate solution to satisfying a manufacturer's duty
to warn.

1. An Incomplete Solution
Advocates of mandatory PPIs, however, continue to envision
them only as an adjunct form of patient information, secondary to the
counseling provided by physicians.71 This reluctance to embrace PPls
as a primary source of drug information stems from two main concerns. First, as a result of the unique distribution system for prescription drugs, physicians are in a much better position to communicate
directly with patients than are manufacturers. Second, the exacting
judicial standard to which PPIs are subjected results in little actual
protection from failure-to-warn liability.
See 21 CF.R. § 310.501 (2000).
See 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (2000).
See 21 C.F.R. § 310.516 (2000).
67 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.305 (2000).
6S See Plant, supra note 50, at 1032.
69 See 60 Fed. Reg. 44,182-44.252 (1995). The FDA previously had proposed expanding
the PPI requirement to all prescription medications. See 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016 (codified at
21 C.F.R. § 203 (1981» (1979). The regulation was quickly revoked a few years later.
mostly due to a lack of support from the health care community. See Revocation of Patient Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,153 (1982): Plant, supra note
SO, at 1033 (identifying development of voluntary, private-sector patient information programs as well as administrative pressures to "deregulate" as other reasons for revocation).
70 For an example, see Roche's full-page advertisement for Xenical, N.Y. Tunes. Oct. 1.
1999, at A17.
71 See Noah, supra note 51, at 177 ("[N)o one suggests that PPls should fuUy replace
professional labeling."); Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 (suggesting that PPIs should be
required in addition to adequate consumer warnings in manufacturers' advertisements):
McGarey, supra note 53, at 148 ("Even with consumer-directed labeling, the primary responsibility for informing consumers about their prescriptions would remain with physicians."): Paytash, supra note 51, at 1369 ("[A] comprehensive FDA-mandated system of
PPIs for all prescription drugs would most effectively complement the information about
those drugs that patients receive from their doctors.").
64
65
66
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a. Prescription Drug Distribution. As a result of the distinctive
distribution system for prescription medications, pharmaceutical manufacturers rarely have an opportunity to communicate directly with
the end users of their products. Approximately eighty percent of all
branded prescription products are sold through drug wholesalers.72
These wholesalers resell the medication to retail pharmacies and hospitals.73 The medication arrives in bulk at the pharmacies where pharmacists repackage it into smaller quantities, dispense it to the patient
as directed by a physician's prescription, and provide counseling.74
Therefore, any mandatory PPI program still ultimately forces manufacturers to rely on physicians and pharmacists to distribute the warnings.7S Furthermore, because manufacturers have little information
on the individual characteristics of a specific patient using their medication or on the disease state the patient is trying to treat with their
medication, PPIs must list comprehensively all possible adverse effects
for all possible patients and treatment scenarios. Since medications
have multiple indications and side effects that can vary based on the
dose that is prescribed or even \vith the patient's race or gender, and
contraindications can differ depending on the patient's concomitant
drug therapy and other disease states, physicians and pharmacists
have important roles in individualizing drug warningS.76 Health care
professionals perform the essential function of sifting through the
myriad of possible warnings and highlighting the most important ones
for each individual patient's situation. Without them, a PPI can easily
"overwarn" a patient, leading to confusion or ungrounded fear in her
prescribed therapy by flooding her with excessive amounts of inform a-

72 See Sheryl L Szeinbach, Drug Distribution, in Pharmacy and the U.S. Health Care
System 317, 321 (Jack E. Fmcham & Albert L Wertheimer eds., 2d cd. 1998) ("[A]bout SO
percent of branded pharmaceutical products were sold through drug wholesalers; 1.3 percent through practitioners; 15.7 percent direct to retaBers, and the rest through other channels."); Maura J. Monaghan & Michael S. Monaghan, Do Market Components Account
for Higher US Prescription Prices?, 30 Annals Pharmacotherapy 1489, 1491 (1996) (providing figure detailing chaDnels of drug distribution).
73 See Szeinbach, supra note 72, at 321 (listing major customers of wholesalers).
74 See Kathleen A. Johnson, Emerging Roles for Pharmacists, in PhanDacy and the
U.S. Health care System, supra note 72, at 217, 235 (noting that dispensing, labeling, and
counseling are primary components of pharmacy practice). The role of pbarm3cists. however, is also expanding to encompass "pharmaceutical care." See id. at 226-34 (describing
"pharmaCeutical care" as emphasizing consultation over dispensing medications).
75 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1075.
76 See Noah, supra note 51, at 175 (stating that physicians are best equipped 10 l3i1or
discussion of drug therapy to needs of individual patients); Paytasb, supra note 51, at 1366
(discussing ability of physician to taBor warning to patient's individual needs, circumstances, and cognitive abilities).
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tion.77 Thus, within the conventional drug distribution system, the
health care professional, with or without a mandatory PPI program,
remains optimally situated to provide the best quality information
most efficiently to the patient.
b. An Exacting Legal Standard. In cases that find an exception
to the learned intermediary rule, manufacturer-provided warnings are
scrutinized under rigorous failure-to-warn standards.7s In applying
this analysis, courts begin by assuming that all risks, no matter how
remote, merit a warning directed to the consumer.79 For example, in
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,80 the plaintiff had less than a one in
a million chance of contracting polio from the manufacturer's vaccine.Sl Nevertheless, the court held that failing to warn of this risk
rendered the vaccine unreasonably dangerous. 82 Likewise, the court
in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,83 while acknowledging that the risk of
contracting polio from the manufacturer's vaccine was "foreseeable
77 See Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) ("[E]xcessive
warnings on product labels may be counterproductive."); Plant, supra note SO, at 1070·71
(noting that overwarning may dilute more important warning information); A.D. 1\verskl
et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Comes of Age,
61 Cornell L. Rev. 495,514-17 (1976) (noting that effective warnings must select carefully
significant risks to warn about).
78 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1038·39 (describing failure-to·warn analysis used by
courts); Schwartz, supra note 51, at 845-46 (arguing that faUure-ta-warn standard without
learned intermediary rule is exacting and will be difficult to meet). But see Perez v. Wyeth
Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,1257 (NJ. 1999) (holding that under New Jersey law, duty to
warn presumptively is met by compliance with federal labeling).
79 See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that manu·
facturer must warn consumer of three million to one risk); Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F. Supp.
1473, 1475 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (stating that warnings required even if number of consumers
who may be harmed is not large); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 530 (Or.
1974) (writing that defendant has duty to warn of statistically insignificant possibility of
injury to plaintiff); Plant, supra note SO, at 1042 ("[C]ourts assume, without much analysis,
either that all risks merit a warning to the consumer, or that a particular risk is significant
enough to warrant a warning.H); see also James A. Henderson. Jr. & Aaron D. 1\verski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty SheD of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 265, 277 (1990) ("Many courts that acknowledge negligence as the substantive
basis of failure-ta-warn liability nevertheless insist on bebaving as though strict liability
were somehow being applied. "); Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approacb to
Failure-to-Warn Law,71 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 141 (1992) ("[A] distinct minority of courts
refuses to accept the basic principle that manufacturers need not warn about remote
risks.").
80 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
81 See id. at 130.
82 See id. at 129-30 (acknowledging that risk was miniscule, yet qualitatively severe
enough to require warning).
83 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
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statistically, although unknowable individually," nonetheless held the
manufacturer liable for not warning of the risk.84
Second, courts demand that printed warnings, even those that encompass all possible risks, be worded in a particular way.8S In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical COrp.,M Ortho's patient warnings
stated that "[t]he most serious known side effect is abnormal blood
clotting which can be fataI."87 Ortho's patient booklet elaborated on
this statement, describing the clots as life threatening if they "break
loose and then lodge in the lung or if they form in other vital organs,
such as the brain."88 Still, the court upheld the jury's determination
that "the absence of a reference to 'stroke' in the warning unduly minimized the warning's impact or failed to make the nature of the risk
reasonably comprehensible to the average consumer."89
Third, courts often will ease the plaintiff's usual burden of proving causation in failure-to-warn cases.90 In typical failure-to-warn
cases, once the plaintiff has established the manufacturer's duty to
provide a warning, she then must prove that she "would have read,
understood, and heeded an adequate warning, thus avoiding the injury
in question."91 In a prescription drug scenario, however, some courts
establish a rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiff that if she
had received the warning, she would not have used the product.92
Id. at 1294.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 79, at 318-19 & 319 n.220 (listing analogous
cases); Jacobs, supra note 79, at 149 (noting that:
By scrutinizing closely the seemingly trivial details of type size, wmuing location, and relative degree of expressed urgency, and by permitting outcomes to
hinge on the presence or absence of one or two seemingly innocuous words.
courts impose upon manufacturers a duty of virtual perfection. easily
breached, and satisfied only by chance.);
Plant, supra note 50, at 1043 (1996) ("[C]ases also impose a significant burden on the mmufacturer to ensure that the warning is artfully worded. ttl.
86 475 N.E.2d 6S (Mass. 1985).
frT Id. at 67 0.3.
88 Id. at 67 0.4.
89 Id. at 71-12!II) See Jacobs, supra note 79. at 162 ("For warnings claims. almost all courts have
adopted one of two approaches to causation, either of which makes it relatively easy for
plaintiffs to satisfy their burden of prooLttl; Plant, supra note SO. at 1049 (writing that wben
courts require drug manufacturers to warn patient directly, they bave been "deferentinl to
plaintiffs in establishing the cause-in-fact elementtt).
91 Jacobs, supra note 79. at 161.
92 See, e.g., Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 6S1 F.2d 642, 646 n.S (4th Cit. 1931) (SlIlting that although manufacturer did not have duty to warn ultimate coDSumer, plaintiH
"would be entitled to the presumption that a warning, had it been given. would have been
heeded"); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1265, 1281 (5th Or. 1974) ("Where a consumer,
whose iojuxy the manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen, is injured by a product
sold without a required warning. a rebuttable presumption will arise that the consumer
would have read any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize
84

8S
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Even those courts that have not granted such a presumption have employed a subjective standard for establishing causation, allowing the
plaintiff to testify as to whether she would have heeded an adequate
waming.93
Critics complain that applying such demanding standards to prescription drugs overdeters prescription drug manufacturers, thereby
reducing the availability of medication.94 Indeed, under these stanthe risks."); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981) ("(\V)here no
warning is given, or where an inadequate warning is given, a rebuttable presumption arises,
beneficial to the plaintiff, that the failure to adequately warn was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's ingestion of the drug."); Jacobs, supra note 79, at 162 ("[A rebuttable presumption] frees plaintiffs from the obligation to prove either their general inclination to read
and obey product warnings or the fact that they have actually done so in the particular
case. "); Plant, supra note 50, at 1050 ("In some cases when courts have held that the mllnUfacturer had a duty to warn the patient directly, the patient is aided by a rebuttable presumption: if he would have received the warning, he would not have used the product.");
Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 ("Some courts, recognizing the difficulty of proving causa·
tion in warning cases, have created a rebuttable presumption of a causal Iinkllge in such
cases."); cf. also Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 79, at 278 ("Many courts have held that
when the defendant fails to provide an adequate warning, it is presumed that such a warning would have been read and heeded by the user had it been given.").
93 See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 72 (stating that:
The jury were free, however, to credit MacDonald's testimony that she would
not have used the pills had she been advised of the danger of 'stroke,' and to
infer that an explicit reference to the risk of stroke might tip the balance in a
reasonable person's choice of a contraceptive method.);
Jacobs, supra note 79, at 162-63 (stating that courts that do not use rebuttable presumption
"employ a subjective standard for establishing causation, allowing a plaintiff to testifyafter the fact of his injury, of course-as to whether he would have read and heeded an
adequate warning had the defendant placed one on its product"); Plant, supra note SO, at
1053 (noting that courts grant plaintiffs "considerable leeway in showing that on adequate
warning would have changed [their) decision[s]"); see also Henderson & 1\verski, supra
note 79, at 305 ("A plaintiff typically can offer little more than self-serving testimony Dnd
anecdotal evidence to establish her proximate causation case.").
94 See Green, supra note 60, at 467 (identifying arguments that tort law results in
overdeterrence that may cause beneficial drugs to be withdrawn from marketplace): W.
Kip VISCUSi et aI., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437,1470-71
(1994) (arguing that imposition of liability has induced manufacturers to leave vaccine
market altogether); Walsh et at., supra note 52, at 874 (noting that if enough jurisdictions
had accepted direct duty to warn standard for oral contraceptives, standard may have
driven them off market or made them substantially less affordable). But see Teresa Moran
Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 Tenn. L. Rev.
1357,1401 (1994) (finding little evidence of liability system's adverse impact OD pharmaceutical industry).
Various alternatives to traditional fallure-to-warn analysis, such as a regulatory compliance defense, have been proposed_ See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong"
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 5S Md. L Rev. 1210, 1213 (1996) ("[A] strong regulatory
compliance defense would .•• more than offset any negative effects that the defense might
have on product safety and victim compensation."); Green, supra note 60, at 508 (writing
that FDA regulatory compliance defense is not "unproblematic"): Henderson & 1\verski,
supra note 79, at 270 ("Concepts such as risk foreseeability, risk-utIlity balancing, and
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darcls, manufacturers cannot realistically rely on the distribution of
PPIs to fulfill their duty to warn in the context of Internet prescribing
situations. When the consumer orders a medication from a prescribing-based site, it is dispensed with little physician interaction and
shipped directly to the consumer. Because the PPI would become the
patient's primary source of information without a health care professional readily available to interpret it, the usual worries that accompany PPIs are heightened. Thus, the PPI is a particularly unrealistic
solution to bridge the warning gap so prevalent in online prescribing
transactions. Moreover, the exacting liability standards used to analyze PPIS95 may deter manufacturers from relying on them at alt, necessarily precluding them from selling medications online unless other
realistic direct-warning systems can be designed. In sum, tremendous
concerns abound regarding both patient safety and the ability of drug
manufacturers to insulate themselves sufficiently from liability, threatening the continuing viability of Internet prescribing and distribution.

2. The End of Internet Prescribing?
A well-run prescribing based site-operating within the contours
of healthy physician-patient relationsbips-could offer certain segments of the population distinct practical advantages over brick and
mortar doctors' offices and pharmacies. These advantages include unparalleled access to health care providers both nationwide and worldwide, the convenience of around-the-clock availability, increased
privacy, and lower costs.96 Additionally, the tremendous autonomy
proximate causation are so devoid of content in the failure·ta-warn context that they cannot hope to test the bona fides of the plaintifPs claim.H); Peter Huber. Safety and the
Second Best The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 8S Colum. L. Rev.
277,335 (1985) ("Requiring-or at least strongly encouraging-the courts to respect the
comparative risk choices made by competent, expert agencies would inject a first. small
measure of rationality into a judicial regulatory system that currently runs quite v.ild.")i
Jacobs, supra note 79, at 177 ("Because the content-based approach to warnings law has
failed, courts need to replace their minute inquiries into the details of risk and adequacy
with a method of analysis that focuses on the procedures used by the manufacturer prior to
the adoption and publication of its warning inCormation.")i Plant, supra note 50. at 1010
("Principles should be adapted from the informed consent context to modify the obligations of pharmaceutical manufacturers so as to accommodate the unique nature of prescription drugs and medical devices."); Teresa Moran Schwartz, '!be Role of Federal Safety
Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 Vande L. Rev. 1121, 1168 (1988) (arguing that
"federal regulatory standards should Dot be treated as conclusively or presumptively adequate measures of safety under the common law"): VISCUSi et aL, supra, at 1439 (Slating
that "tort liability should be limited through federallegistation"). The appropriate state of
failure-ta-warn doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note; the risk of pOlentilllliability is
the emphasis here, not how that liability will be, or should be, determined.
9S See supra DOtes 78-93 and accompanyiDg texL
96 See Hubbard 'Iestimony, supra Dote 45 (detailing the "mIlDY" bencfilS of prescription
drug sales over the Internet); Senate Testimony, supra note 28 (noting that benefilS include
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the Internet provides patients can spur them to learn more about their
medical conditions and history as well as to research their medications
more thoroughly.97 More generally, the lessons learned from developing effective prescribing-based sites can help harness the Internet as a
tool to streamline the massive information exchanges between physi-

access to drugs for the disabled or otherwise home-bound, for whom a trip to
the pharmacy can be difficult; the convenience of shopping 24 hours a day; an
almost unlimited number of products for customers; and privacy for those who
don't want to discuss their medical condition in a public place);

Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 96 (statement of Janet Woodcock) (illegitimate
prescription drug sales on the Internet can provide tremendous benefits to consumers.");
American Med. Ass'n, Guidelines for Medical Practice Through the Internet, Resolution
832 (1999) <http://www.ama-assn.org!meetings/publiclannuaI99/reports/onsite/rtflh832.rtf>
(stating that Internet medicine may be used "to reduce cost and improve access to health
care delivery by preventing unnecessary patient travel"); Barbara J. 'lYler, Cyberdoctors:
The Vlt1ual Housecall-The Actual Practice of Medicine on the Internet Is Here; Is It n
Telemedical Accident Waiting to Happen?, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 259, 278 (1998) (U[P]roblems of
unequal treatment of rural and urban patients can be dealt with using telemedicine as n
conduit to deliver these services."); Ellen Almer, Online Therapy: An Arm's-Length Approach, N.Y. TlIDes, Apr. 22, 2000, at Al (noting that:
Some experts on mental health agree that online counseling, through e-mail,
real-time e-mail exchange, and eventually video conferencing, is one of the
most prOmising developments of the maturing Internet because it opens up
new treatment options to people in remote areas, the disabled and those who
feel too stigmatized to seek treatment for mental illnesses.).
Such advantages might be particularly beneficial to the estimated 38.5 million Americans
without health insurance and the estimated 43 million Americans living in "medically underserved" areas. See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 54, at 38, 40.
97 See Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or nap for the Unwary?, 42 St. Louis U. LJ. 89, 155-56 (1998) (stating that:
In light of the changes in the healthcare system ••• patients must take more
responsibility for their own healtbcare. Physicians.. . have their own set of
conflicting interests to worry about ...• In order for patients to manage their
own healthcare responsibly, they must be able to obtain information and use it
appropriately.);
Plant, supra note SO, at 1036 ("Patients are increasingly interested in and receptive to information about their diseases and possible modes of treatment."); William M. Silberg et al.,
Assessing, Controlling, and Assuring the Quality of Medical Information on the Internet:
Caveat Lector et Viewor-Let the Reader and Viewer Beware, 277 JAMA 1244, 1244
(1997) ("[T]he Internet hosts a large number of high-quality medical resources and poses
seemingly endless opportunities to inform, teach, and connect professionals and patients
alike."); 'lYler, supra note 96, at 269 ("The necessity for information for one's diagnosis or
medical options has never been more obvious than now when consumers are faced with
government and medicare funding cutbacks, hospital closings, waiting lists for surgical procedures, and doctors' and nurses' strikes."): David J. Morrow, Health Care Consumers
Can Expect Change, and a Shock or 'lWo, N.Y. Tnnes, Dec. 20, 1999, at C6 ("One of the
biggest changes during the next 10 to 20 years is expected to be the increasing role of tbe
patient in choosing his or her treatment. Instead of relying only on their doctors' advice,
consumers will also use medical information from the Internet and prescription-drug ad
• .It).
campugDS
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cians, insurers, pharmacies, and manufacturers now conducted on
reams of paper forms.98
The AMA also has identified at least three situations in which
Internet prescribing may be used for legitimate electronic prescribing
purposes.!19 For instance, after a physician examines a patient, she
could enter a prescription order online for that patient and transmit it
online to the pharmacy.lOO Alternately, if a patient has been and remains under the care of a physician, and has been seen in person by
the physician in the recent past, the patient could contact electronically the physician when no refills remain on a previous prescription,
and the physician could authorize the renewal online to the pha.rmacy.10l Fmally, the AMA notes that it may be appropriate for a physician to consult a patient online and issue that patient a new
prescription pursuant to that online consultation if the physician has
an ongoing relationship with the patient, has the patient's medical history and physical information available at the time of the consultation,
and has seen the patient in the recent past. In this limited situation,
new prescriptions for particular medications legitimately may be
transmitted online to the pharmacy without an additional office
visit.102 In light of these potential advantages, the AMA has stated
that "[c]are must be taken to protect and even enhance legitimate
electronic prescribing and dispensing practices."103 Therefore, it is important that prescribing-based sites are not abandoned merely be98 See Tyler, supra note 96, at 289 ("The benefits of on-line teleconferencing and consultations as well as the on-line practice of medicine in this era of limited health care dol1m and managed care are inestimable!'). Healtheon/Webf\ID. an Intemet-based
company, has already announced plans to link patients, doctors. and insurers online. See
Milt Freudenheim, Confronting the Reality of a Health Care VISion, N.Y. Tunes. Feb. 28.
2000, at Cl ("The potential market is a mindboggling 30 billion health care transactions
annually."); see also Alissa R. Spielberg. On Call and Online: Sociohistorical. Leglll. and
Ethical Implications of E-Mail for the Patient-Physician Relationship, 280 lAMA 1353,
1353 (1998) ("[E]-mail has the potential to reach every physician and in turn to lllter all or
a physician's subsequent relationships.").
99 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 2SS (statement or Hennan I.
Abromowitz); Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 8.
100 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 2SS (statement or Hennan I.
Abromowitz).
101 See ide
102 See ide (using example of prescn"bing antihistamine pursuant to electronic
consultation).
103 Id. Unfortunately, legitimizing prescn"bing·based sites may enable some bad actors
to obtain drugs fraudulently. Yet even under our current drug distributioD S)'Stem, bad
actors can lie to their doctors and forge prescriptions to procure medication improperly.
'Ibis Note does not consider whether such. fraud wD1 be pervasive enough to outweigh the
benefits of online prescribing. Using a strict failure-la-warn liability analysis to limit the
types of drugs available online, see infra Part m, however, should prevent the most problematic drugs from being marketed in this way.
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cause of the inability of our current regulatory system to police the
safety of these transactions.104
Only by improving prescribing-based sites and forcing them to
operate responsibly, either by expanding the involvement of a doctor
with the online transaction or by increasing the quality of the patient
information provided, can their vast potential be realized. 1os Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether legislative or administrative mandates
effectively could compel these websites, notorious for their ability to
evade regulation, to reform their prescribing methods.106 Furthermore, given the rapid pace of change within the Internet, such regulations likely will be obsolete before they are promulgated. t07 Finally,
any proposed solution must ensure that both domestic and foreign
websites will act to increase the safety of their transactions.

III
ENHANCING THE SAFETY OF ONLINE PRESCRIBING:

A

PROPOSAL

This Note proposes that pharmaceutical manufacturers themselves are optimally situated to improve the operation of prescribingbased sites. Frrst, manufacturers can utilize the capabilities of the Internet to create comprehensive patient information systems that convey adequate warnings directly to the online patient. Scrutinizing
patient information systems under a traditional failure-to-warn liability framework would increase effectively the quality of patient care
provided by web sites without imposing an absolute ban on online prescribing. Second, to ensure that warnings will be distributed by websites regardless of where in the world they are based, the
manufacturers, and not the government, must obligate websites to implement these systems. By balancing manufacturers' commercial in104 See Cohen, supra note 27, at 1 ("'The regulatory system for drugs was created at a
time when the Internet was not envisioned.'" (quoting William Hubbard, deputy associate
commissioner of FDA». See generally Bendavid, supra note 25 (arguing that current regulatory scheme is largely outdated).
lOS See Spielberg, supra note 98, at 1358 ("[B]lectronic communication, as a novel technology, is neither inherently unethical nor readily acceptable for medical practice. Rather,
the emergence of electronic communication launches a reexamination of the necessary values for good communication in the patient-physician relationship."); Terry, supra note 18,
at 350 (describing various ''new manifestations of cybermedicine"); 'lYler, supra note 96, at
283 ("Telemedicine could result in revolutionary changes in our health care delivery system. tI): Morrow, supra note 97 ("Health experts are confident that drugs win routinely be
bought through the Internet, including treatments for serious conditions.").
106 See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
107 See Green. supra note 26, at 368 (arguing that regulating Internet is "unlikely to be
successful given that rapid technological advances can render such regulations obsolete by
the time they are published").
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terests in online prescribing, the practical advantages to consumers of
online prescribing, and the health and safety concerns of patients, this
proposal provides manufacturers with an economically viable way to
enhance the safety of online prescribing.

A. Conveying Adequate Warnings Directly to the Patient: Revisited
The Internet can be used to create comprehensive patient information systems that improve the quality of the warnings conveyed to
the online patient. Analyzing comprehensive patient information systems under traditional faiIure-to-warn liability, and indeed, even
under the learned intermediary rule, will encourage safer forms of Internet prescribing. This Section suggests two approaches to satisfying
manufacturers' duty to warn: enhancing the online physician-patient
relationship or distributing Individualized Patient Reports (IPRs).

1. Enhancing the Online Physician-Patient Relationship: Extending

the Learned Intermediary Rule
Increasing the amount of physician interaction given to the patient on each transaction is one way of enhancing the quality of patient information provided in the Internet prescribing conteh1.
Instead of merely presenting a prospective patient with an online
questionnaire, for example, a website could implement an instant messaging system to allow the patient and a physician to interact with
each other in real time. lOS Such an information exchange, albeit virtual, would resemble more closely a face-to-face examination in a physician's office than the typical online questionnaire. The physician
would be able to ask all of her questions in real time and immediately
receive the patient's answers, much as if they were speaking by telephone. If a court is convinced that the online information excbange is
comprehensive enough to constitute a true physician-patient relationship and that the drug is dispensed according to an individualized
medical judgment, then it should apply the learned intermediary
108 Instant messaging allows users to converse online at the pate of a normal convcrsation. For an example of instant messaging, see leQ (visited July S. lOGO) <http://
www.icq.com>.This type of physician-patient communication already is being implemented by CyberDocs, (visited July 8, 2000) <http://\V\Vw.cyberdocs.com>, which offers
physician consultations through audio-video comerencing and/or interactive kcyboard
chat. There are also websites offering psychiatric counseling and treatment online. See
here2listen.com (visited July 8. 2000) <http://w\Vw.here2listca.com>;meatalbealthline.com
(visited July 18. 2000) <http://www.mentalhealthline.com>;seealsoJonathanMandeD.lt·s
Often Hard to Find Help Behind the Cybercounter, N.Y. TIDIes. Dec. 2. 1999, at G7 (discussing provision of customer service via interactive chat).
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rule. 109 By extending the learned intermediary doctrine to cover such
situations, courts would provide manufacturers with an incentive to
develop these higher quality online information exchanges. Expanding the learned intermediary rule to protect websites that implement enhanced online physician-patient relationships will encourage
the development of Internet prescribing into a reliable source for prescription drug consumers.
While a virtual examination may not be the ideal traditional consultation originally envisioned by the learned intermediary rule, our
modem health care system has eviscerated the traditional physicianpatient relationship.l1O Despite this, courts have continued to apply
the learned intermediary rule, even in situations where the plaintiff
argues that the physician-patient relationship was subpar.lll In
Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, inc.,112 the plaintiff's son died from an
overdose of prescription anesthetic administered by a nurse anesthetiSt. 113 Though the nurse "testified that he alone determined the dosage,"114 the court found that since the physician "was present at all
times ... he assumed the role of 'learned intermediary.' "115 Similarly,
in Bacardi v. Holzman,116 the court applied the learned intermediary
rule notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim that "he did not even know
109 If the current state of technology does not allow online information exchanges between pbysician and patient to rise to the level of a face-to-face consultation, courts should
assign the duty to warn patients to the manufacturers. The manufacturers either will halt
online sales or attempt to develop better ways to warn patients about their medications.
For a thorough explanation of how a drug manufacturer should weigh liability risks. see
Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 477·79 (5th Cir.1987) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
The learned intermediary rule "carrot," however, will remain, encouraging manufacturers
who wish to sell their medications online to develop the technology that will someday
enable online information exchanges to become and be deemed true physician'patient
relationships.
110 See supra Part II.B.
111 See, e.g., Pumphrey v. c.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. W. Va. 1995)
(plaintiff argued that hospital setting did not allow for adequate communication between
herself and surgeon); KrasnopoJsky v. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1342
(B.D.N.Y. 1992) (plaintiff argued that doctor had examined him in impersonal clinical setting); Bacardi v. Holzman, 442 A.2d 617, 619 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (plaintiff
argued that none of many different doctors he had seen at various clinics and hospitals
individually had balanced risks involved); Taurino v. EUen. 579 A.2d 92S. 926 (pa. Super.
Ct. 1990) (plaintiff claimed that oral contraceptive was dispensed by cUnic without intervention of physician).
112 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987).
113 See id. at 465.
114 Id. at 466.
115 Itt. at 470. In a noteworthy dissent, Judge Goldberg argued that "[t]he fnUure of a
doctor to exercise his fiduciary duty to supervise care and to prevent unqualified persons ••• from prescribing fentanyl cannot be consistent with performing a 'learned intermediary' role." Id. at 473 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
116 442 A.2d 617 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
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the names of some of the physicians who had treated him."1l7 The
plaintiff in Taurino v. Ellen118 argued that she was "supplied the drug
by an employee of the clinic who was not a doctor. "119 The court
stated that "[e]ven assuming that [the plaintiff] was originally given
Loestrin without the intervention of a physician[,] ••• a physician did
note that [the plaintiff] would take Loestrin before she began taking
it,"120 and applied the learned intermediary rule.121
For many of the reasons discussed in Part IT.A, courts are loath to
disregard the learned intermediary rule even in situations where the
quality of the physician-patient relationship is tenuous at best. l22 The
continued availability of medication on the Internet, if within vigilantly controlled confines, should be afforded no less protection. Applying the learned intermediary rule to an online physician-patient
relationship merely forces courts and manufacturers alike to examine
carefully every aspect of the online relationship to ensure that it is
similar in quality to a face-to-face consultation.l23 For guidance on
how to apply this standard, courts should look to the AMA's minimum. standards of care.124 If the court is satisfied that the online physician-patient relationship established by the prescribing-based site
meets these criteria, it should extend failure-to-warn immunity to the
manufacturer as long as it properly warned the online prescribing doctor. To conduct that analysis, a court should consider whether the
doctor performed a thorough examination to determine whether an
actual medical problem existed and to make a specific diagnosis. Second, there must be a dialogue between the physician and the patient
to discuss treatment alternatives and to determine the best course of
treatment. 'Third, the physician must effectively establish, or have
ready access to, a reliable medical history. Fourth, the physician must
Id. at 619.
579 A.2d 925 (pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 926.
Id. at 928.
121 See id. at 930.
122 See Plant, supra note 50, at 1054 ("[T]he doctrine better accommodates the presaip.
tion drug context than the application of traditional products liability failure-ta-warn principles. Physicians may no longer have primary control over prescribing drugs. and
consumers may have a greater need for more information about drugs; however. presaip.
tion drugs are still not a typical consumer product.H).
123 Cf. Paytash, supra note 51, at 1364 ("It does not fonow that because a more personalized doctor/patient relationship is preferable and ideal, that the lack of such a relationship
renders medical decisions inadequate.").
124 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 254 (statement of Herman I.
Abromowitz) (outlining American Medical Association'S minimum standards of care)i Report of the ~ supra note 22, at 5 ("[Ilt is important to stress that the use of the internet does not obviate the physician's obligation to meet appropriate standards of care
when dealing with patients.").
117
118
119
120
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provide adequate warning information to the patient. Finally, in certain cases, follow-up care will be necessary and the site will have to
implement systems to make that possible.l2S
The promise of a safe harbor from failure-to-warn liability will
encourage a manufacturer to screen carefully the websites it sells its
products to and to work with those websites to develop enhanced online physician-patient relationships. Certainly, there will be drugs that
are so complex that no amount of online information exchange will
adequately inform the patient of the risks involved.126 In such cases, it
will be unreasonable for the manufacturer to have relied on an online
physician to provide sufficient information for the specific drug; it sim~
ply should not be dispensed online. However, there are many other
medications that could be prescribed and dispensed safely online. By
balancing patient safety concerns with the advantages of Internet prescribing, and then instituting proper safeguards, a certain number of
prescribing-based sites will be improved markedly, allowing the public
to benefit from a new, safe model of drug distribution.

2.

Leaving the Learned Intermediary Behind: A More Radical
Proposal

As an alternative to bolstering the online physician-patient relationship, manufacturers might help the websites to distribute enhanced patient warnings that improve upon the traditional PPI. Such
a model assumes that a physician would issue the prescription pursuant to an online questionnaire much as they do now, with minimal
patient interaction; therefore, the shield of the learned intermediary
rule would be inappropriate. The website, however, could provide the
patient with Individualized Patient Reports (IPRs) to compensate for
the reduced role of the prescribing physician. Since these IPRs will be
examined closely under a traditional failure-to-warn liability framework, manufacturers will have strong incentives both to design optimal warnings and to consider carefully which types of medications to
allow to be distributed in this way.
us See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 254 (statement of Herman I.
Abromowitz).
126 Determining which medications could be appropriate for online prescribing would
involve extensive therapeutic expertise; these reasonableness determinations probably will
rely primarily on expert medical testimony. For a list of medications that one website has
indicated as "inappropriate for online prescribing," see CyberDocs (visited July 8, 2000)
<http://www.cyberdocs.comlnonprescribed.htm>. The list is primarily composed of controDed substances and is therefore not as weD thought out as a court would requIre. It is
presented merely as an oversimplified example.

November 2000]

a.

ONLINE PRESCRIBING

1481

Individualized Patient Reports. (1) Comprehensive Patient

Information Reports: Under this proposal, manufacturers, in conjunction with the FDA, should first fashion comprehensive patient information reports for all of the medications to be sold on prescribingbased sites. This process could mimic the one already in place for the
approval of the contents of a new drug's professional labeling, which
requires manufacturers to submit to the FDA "a great deal of information about how the drug should be used, and safety-related information that includes contraindications, known adverse effects, and
precautions in usage to avoid identified risks."127 For most approved
prescription medications, this information is already found on the
drug's package insert. The bulk of the work would be translating this
wealth of complex medical information into language readily comprehendible by lay persons.
(2) The Online Questionnaire: Once the report is created, the
manufacturers should implement a standard online questionnaire to
be used by the prescribing-based sites. Any individual characteristics
that physicians would find pertinent in making their prescribing decisions, such as sex, race, age, weight, allergies, and blood pressure
should be included in the questionnaire. In addition, manufacturers
should include other more esoteric characteristics that are material in
light of the particular drug being prescribed. The questionnaire must
also contain a section where the patient can indicate any other medications she currently is taking. Creating the ideal questionnaire will
be much like creating the ideal report, in that it will involve a careful
balance between brevity and detail. It should not be overly lengthy,
lest it tempt patients to skip parts of it, but it must be detailed enough
to allow for as much individualized profiling as possible.
(3) Individualization: By using the patient's answers to the online questionnaire, the website could create an individualized profile
of the patient.128 The IPR then could customize itself to conform to
the answers provided in the questionnaire, emphasizing the information that a patient fitting that profile would find most material.129 For
example, depending on whether the patient for which the drug was
127 Green, supra note 60, at 488; see also 21 c.F.R. §§ 601.2, 6D1.12, 6Dl.25 (2000):
VJScusi et at., supra note 94, at 1440-46 (describing FDA's approval process Cor drug
labeling).
.
128 For examples of profiling. see, e.g., My Yahoo! (visited July S. 2000) <http://
www.my.yahoo.com>;myCNN.com (visited July 8, 2000) <http://www.mY.CDlLcom>.
129 See Henderson & 'l\verski, supra note 79. at 307 (noliag that "the order in which
information is presented has a significant impact on its perception by the individU3l who
must ultimately utilize the data to reach a decision"): Plut, supra note SO. at 1070 (arguing
that manufacturers should be required to disclose information only when reasonable patient would find it material).

1482

NEW YORK UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1452

intended was six years old or sixty years old, certain sections of the
IPR would be highlighted, allowing the IPR to be comprehensive
enough to encompass most known risks while minimizing "overwarning" the patient. The IPR could be shown to the patient online, preferably before the final order confirmation, so that the patient has a
chance to review the pertinent risks of the medication before purchasing it. Once the medication is ordered, the IPR could be printed out
and delivered with the patient's order.130
IPRs could effectively provide consumers who order drugs from
prescribing-based sites with adequate warning information reasonably
tailored to their individual profile, thus improving IJpOn the tnd;tionnl
PPI. Of course, this printed information will in many cases be inferior
to information received through personally consulting with a physician or by speaking directly to a dispensing pharmacist. Yet, measured against the quality of patient information typically provided in
the current weakened state of the physician-patient relationship, this
will not always be the case.

b. A Case for Traditional Failure-to-Warn Liability. If manufacturers choose to implement IPRs as described above, traditional
failure-to-warn liability analysis would provide manufacturers with the
proper incentives to police the Internet prescribing phenomenon, ensuring patient safety. In fact, it would be desirable if the exacting
standards discussed in Part II.C.1.b prevented manufacturers from
selling their medications to unscrupulous websites, distributing inadequate IPRs, or making particularly complex medications available to
any website for online sale. Under this proposal, manufacturers will
be free to partner with websites that they determine are reputable and
create an extensive IPR program to accompany specific drugs they
have deemed suitable for online sale. What the manufacturers must
expect, however, is that the IPR thus created will be highly scrutinized
under traditional failure-to-warn liability doctrine. The onus will be
on the manufacturers to create the perfect IPR: readily understandable, sufficiently specific, and comprehensive. For certain medications
this will be an impossible task, and liability concerns justifiably will
prevent those medications from being sold online. Liability concerns
will also deter manufacturers from selling their products to certain
websites unable to implement an IPR program adequately. Likewise,
130 Additionally. the printout could include a toll·free phone number that patients could
use to contact a health care professional with any additional questions tbey might have.
Such a help center could be maintained by the manufacturer as part of their obligation to
provide the PPIs and could serve as the final opportunity for the patients to receive highly
individualized information about their medication.
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if these IPRs fail to improve upon traditional PPIs to any significant
degree, this liability standard will restrict their use, thereby precluding
manufacturers from relying on this method of disseminating warnings
to patients to fulfill their duty to warn.
Admittedly, a proposal to rely on IPRs as the sole source of drug
information undoubtedly will encounter tremendous resistance from
the medical community. In the absence of an extensive physician-patient relationship, creating IPRs that are sufficiently specific, yet thorough enough to be the patient's primary information source, will be
extremely difficult. At its most conservative, this proposal couldand probably should-be used as an adjunct to the enhanced online
physician-patient relationship described above. At its most ex1reme,
such a proposal could force the reclassification of a particular class of
medications to "quasi-prescription"; that is, medications that, based
on their side-effect profiles, can be dispensed safely with a minimal
amount of physician involvement and an adequate amount of patient
information.131 The possible weighing of the advantages and disadvantages that would be associated with the creation of a class of
"quasi-prescription" medications, on the basis of either increased access or decreased cost, can only be debated once a feasible system for
their distribution has been enabled. Regardless of whether a new
class of "quasi-prescription" drugs ever arises, to the ex1ent that this
proposal improves upon the quality of traditional PPIs, it undoubtedly
can be implemented within our current scheme of drug distribution.

B. Distributing Adequate Risk Information in Internet
Prescribing Situations
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are best situated to make certain
that adequate risk information will be provided by websites that distribute drugs and thus contractually should obligate websites to implement the proposals discussed in Part m.A. As outlined in Part It it is
unlikely that the government will be able to require all these sites,
many of which are based in foreign countries, to distribute adequate
patient warnings. The only common party to all of the sites around
the world is the manufacturer, the source of all the medication sold on
these sites, whether they are based in Boston or Bali. Since manufacturers are held to be experts on how their products are distributed,132
131 Possible candidates may include prescription antihistamines suth as Clmtin or Al·
legra. These medications have a low incidence of side effects and are aVDilable \\ithout a
prescription in Canada. The side effect information required in an adequate patient warn·
ing may be too complex for traditional over-the-counter labeliDg. but might be conveyed
adequately in the manner proposed here.
132 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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they are required to know which of the wholesalers or pharmacies
they currently deal with are involved with prescribing-based sites. In
fact, federal regulations already require pharmaceutical manufacturers to track the distribution of their products carefully. Manufacturers
must keep lists of all authorized distributors for their products.133 Prescription drug wholesalers must maintain detailed records of the companies they deal with and "drug pedigrees" for medications they
sell.134 Every drug manufacturer must have the capability to notify
133 See 21 U.S.c. § 353(e)(1)(B) ("Each manufacturer of a drug ... shall maintdn at its
corporate offices a current list of the authorized distributors of record of such a drug. ");
see also Robert T. Angarola & Judith E. Beach, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act: A
Solution in Search of a Problem?, 51 Food & Drug LJ. 21,41 (1996) (discussing adoption
of regUlation by FDA).
The possibility exists that drugs still may find their way onto the open market outside
of authorized distribution channels, especially in poorly regulated foreign jurisdictions. A
plaintiff injured in this situation who seeks to indemnify the manufacturer will have to
show that the manufacturer's breach of its duty to warn was the proximate cause of her
injury. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 15 cmt. e (1997) (noting
that causal connection is required between defect and harm). When drugs are diverted
criminally or fraudulently, this may be a difficult showing for the plaintiff to make since
courts often find that criminal acts of third parties break the chain of causation. See, e.g.,
Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 319 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that "the terrorists'
actions were superseding and intervening events breaking the chain of causation," thus
undermining plaintiffs' negligence claim); Gaines-Tabb v. lCI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160
F.3d 613, 621 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that
under comment b [of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448], the criminal acts
of a third party may be foreseeable if (1) the situation provides a temptation to
which a 'recognizable percentage' of persons would yield, or (2) the temptation
is created at a place where 'persons of a peculiarly vicious type are likely to be'
and holding that criminal conduct of bombers was unforeseeable and broke chain of causation); Henry v. Merck & Co., Frl7 F.2d 1489,1495 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that "intervening
factors [can break] the causal nexus between the original actor's careless behavior and the
resulting injury" and that "(w]hen the intervening act is intentionally tortious or criminal, it
is more likely to be considered independent"); McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F.
Supp. 366,369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that:
Plaintiffs' argue that because Olin [the ammunition manufacturer1 could have
foreseen criminal misuse of its product, it should not have manufactured the
ammunition. Plaintiffs do not allege, however, that any special relationship
existed between Olin and Ferguson [the murderer who used ammunition made
by Olin] that would give Olin the authority and ability to control Ferguson's
actions. In the absence of such a relationship, New York courts do not impose
a duty to control the actions of third parties.).
134 See 21 U.s.C. § 353(e)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that wholesale distributors who are not
authorized distributors of record must "provide to the person who receives the drug a
statement ••• identifying each prior sale, purchase, or trade of such a drug"); 21 C.P.R.
§ 205.5(a)(3) (2000) (stating minimum required information for licensure as wholesale prescription drug distributor includes "addresses, telephone numbers, and the names of contact persons for all facilities used by the licensee for the storage, handling, and distribution
of prescription drugs"). These statements are commonly termed ·'drug pedigrees." Sec
Angarola & Beach, supra note 133, at 41-43 (explaining drug pedigrees); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 205.50 (2000) (setting out requirements for drug sales by wholesale drug distributors).
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"each of its affected direct accounts" about possible drug recaIls. 135
Also, since the websites maintain direct contact with the patient, forcing them to distribute risk information through these contractual arrangements alleviates many of the logistical difficulties previously
mentioned.136 Therefore, as a precondition to selling their medications to a pharmacy or wholesaler that engages in Internet prescribing,
manufacturers contractually should obligate purchasers to implement
effective patient information systems.137

1. Contractual Assignment of a Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's
Duty to Warn
. Once a manufacturer creates a comprehensive patient information system, it then must obligate the websites to implement it effectively. The leading case permitting a pharmaceutical manufacturer to
assign its duty to warn contractually is Mazur v. ~ferck & CO.13S In
Mazur, the Philadelphia health department purchased Merck's MMR
IT vaccine for the city's immunization program.139 Merck sold the
medication pursuant to a contractual provision obligating the United
States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to ensure that the vaccine
would be administered (1) on the basis of an individualized medical
judgment by a physician, or (2) \vith meaningful warnings, provided
directly to the patient.l40 Pursuant to the latter provision, the CDC
created an "Important Information Statement" informing patients in
lay language of the risks of the vaccine, and obligated the Philadelphia
health department to distribute the statement to vaccinees, or their
135 21 c.F.R. § 7.49 (2000); see also Michael B. McMains & Catherine M. Morrison, The
Impact of Technological Advancement on Pharmaceutical Company Liability. 30 Ind. 1..
Rev. 487, 489 (1997) (explaining recall requirements).
13~ See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying texL
137 As discussed in supra note 72, the purchaser could be :1 distributor or the website
itself. The manufacturer either could contract directly with the website or with the distributor who would. in tum, contractually obligate the website to implement these S)'Stems.
Th~ manufacturer should be able to bind foreign-based sites through these privnte contracts as welL It is beyond the scope of this Note, bowever, to consider the possible jurisdictional issues of enforcing such contracts.
138 964 F.2d 1348 (3d Or. 1992). For another case bolding that Merck contractually
could obligate the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to warn the ultimate user. see
Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931. 935 (M.D. Ga. 1986), arret. 831 F.2d 1069 (11th
Or. 1987); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264.1276 (5th CII'.1974) ("[T]he manufacturer is required to warn the ultimate consumer. or to see tI,al/,e is wamed. " (emphasis
added»; Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc.. 399 Fold 121, 131 (9th CII'. 1968) ("[I1t is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warniog.").
139 See Mazur. 964 F.2d at 1350.
140 See id. at 1351.
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parents or guardians.141 Applying the mass immunization exception
to the learned intermediary rule,142 the court first held that Merck did
indeed have an obligation to warn users directly of the risks of its
vaccine.143 Applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, however, the court also held that "a vaccine manufacturer may satisfy its
duty to warn in the mass immunization context by obligating the CDC
to warn users directly if it informs that agency of the facts which make
its vaccine dangerous and reasonably relies on it to communicate such
information to users in lay terms."144 The court first concluded that
the package circular distributed with the MMR II vaccine was adequate to inform the CDC of the dangers associated with the vaccine.145 The court also noted that Merck had researched the CDC
carefully before agreeing to sell its vaccine and continually monitored
the CDC's dissemination efforts.146 Finally, "[g]iven the resources
and funding available to the CDC, as well as its expertise in immunology and public vaccination," the court held that Merck reasonably relied on the CDC to warn users of its vaccine directly.147
In order to ensure that prescribing-based sites will distribute adequate warnings, pharmaceutical manufacturers should draft contracts
similar to Merck's contract with the CDC in Mazur. That is, manufacturers either coUld obligate the site to dispense their drug only after
an individualized medical decision by an online physician, or require
them to distribute meaningful patient warnings (Le., IPRs), thus adeSee id. This arrangement is analogous to the proposal outlined supra Part III.A.2.
See supra note 58.
143 See Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1369.
144 Id. at 1365. Under Pennsylvania law, the court noted that an unavoidably unsafe
product under comment k is not considered under § 402A but under § 388, which requires
the manufacturers to meet a standard of reasonableness, and not one of strict liability. See
id. at 1364-66.
145 See id. at 1367.
146 See id. at 1368.
147 Id. Admittedly, the heavily case-specific nature of the "reasonableness" test may
lead courts to reach varying results. In Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994),
the plaintiff was injured in a similar situation by the same MMR II vaccine. See id. at 95152. Even though Merck contractually had obligated the CDC to warn the vDccinees, the
court found that the CDC had "admitted biases against 'discourag[ing] the use of vaccines.'" Id. at 958 n.17 (alteration in original). Accordingly. the court reasoned that "a jury
could conclude that Merck knew or had reason to know that the CDC was not going to
provide the truth about Merck's product and did not, in fact, give proper warning." Id.
Therefore, "Merck fully realized how inadequate the warning really was." Id. In a dissenting opinion. Justice Young concluded that Merck reasonably relied on the CDC to formulate and distribute proper warnings for its vaccine. See id. at 968-69 (Young, J., dissenting).
However, the ambiguity inherent in any reasonableness test can also be its strength.
Courts adjudicating Internet prescribing cases will confront ever evolving technology. A
reasonableness test will be flexible enough to encompass the widely varying fact patterns
that courts are sure to encounter.
141
142
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quately informing them of the pertinent dangers in the products.
Mazur~s reasonableness test would encourage manufacturers to investigate these sites carefully, examining the site's credibility, the procedures that it would use to implement a patient information program,
and the resources that the site mayor may not have in place to create
a proper physician-patient relationship. It would not be reasonable
for a manufacturer to enter into such contracts with every prescribingbased site, and the knowledge that dealing with an unscrupulous site
may expose it to potential liability will discourage the manufacturer
from dealing with such sites. A careful application of the },[aZlir test
ensures that manufacturers maintain ultimate responsibility over the
implementation of the warning system. 148
The reasonableness test also would limit the types of medications
sold online, encouraging manufacturers to consider carefully whether
it is reasonable for particular drugs to be distributed online.149 Manufacturers would also have the duty to visit these sites often to monitor
the effectiveness of their warning efforts and to refuse to sell their
medications to any sites that are not complying with their contractual
obligations.
Contractually obligating prescribing-based sites to distribute patient warnings is an efficient way to require these websites to improve
their prescribing practices. By obligatirig certain prescribing-based
sites to implement adequate patient s~eguards, some of the sites will
become viable alternatives to the traditional drug distribution system.
148 Courts that have addressed the delegation of the duty to warn by a pharmaceutical
. manufacturer emphasize that the manufacturer must maintain ultimate responsibility over
the warning system it chooses to implement See Petty v. United States. 740 F.2d 1428.
1440 (8th eir.1984) ("Delegation of the duty [to warn] does not, in jtself. relieve the manufacturer ••• from liability for deficiencies in the manner in which the chosen intermediary
effectuates the manufacturer's duty."); AUison. 878 P.2d at 959 ("[A]lthough a manufacturer may decide to assign its duty to warn of the unsafeness of its product to othars. a
manufacturer cannot be relieved of ultimate responsibility for assuring that jts unsaIe product is dispensed with a proper warning!'). In Petty. the U.S. govcrnment had assumed thc
duty to warn about a swine flu vaccine from the vaccine manufacturar. See Petty. 740 F.2d
at 1439-41. The court held that the government's warning was inadequate and therefore
the manufacturer was liable. See id. at 1441 & 0.12.
149 See Swayze v. McNeU Lab.• Inc.. 807 F.2d 464. 477 (5th Cir. 1987) (Goldberg, J••
dissenting) ("If McNeil [drug manufacturer) had preferred not to run the foreseeable risk
of liability, McNeil could have changed the circumstances under which it provided the

drug.").

Though there are no large-scale studies available showing that telemedicine is as safe
and effective as in·person consultations \vith a physician. II small study conducted by the
Medical College of Georgia found no difference between the diagnoses pb)"Sicians made
using a telecommunications link and those diagnoses they made in person. See '!Yler.
supra Dote 96, at 279. For further discussion of telemedicine and possible medical malpractice liability, see generally Kearney, supra note 29. at 300-02; Spielberg. supra note 29. at
287-93.
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Those sites that refuse to, or cannot, adhere to these contractual
guidelines will be cut off from their drug supply by the manufacturers
and will wither away.
CONCLUSION

Internet prescribing has the potential to put millions of consumers at the risk of injury, presenting pharmaceutical manufacturers with
a host of potential liability concerns. These concerns must be balanced against the tremendous commercial possibilities and practical
advantages offered by Internet prescribing. At this early stage, with
the full potential of the Internet far from realized, it would be inadvis~
able and unnecessary for the government to place wholesale restrictions on prescribing-based websites. Instead, failure-to-warn analysis
can be used as a framework for drug manufacturers to improve the
quality and safety of Internet prescribing. By encouraging the development of safer forms of Internet prescribing, instead of banning it
entirely, the public can continue to benefit from the online health care
revolution.

